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ABSTRACT
A system’s memory access control mechanisms profoundly impact the per-
formance, reliability, security, and composability of the software it runs. De-
sirable features of an access control mechanism include: the ability to grant
arbitrary permissions on any region of memory to any thread in the system;
zero-copy sharing between threads with no restrictions on the set of shar-
ers, region granularity, or sharing of pointer-based data structures; time and
space overheads dependent only on the fundamental complexity of the access
control being requested; and well-defined, hierarchical memory region own-
ership and permission semantics. The virtual-memory-based access control
used in most modern systems, as well as recently proposed enhancements,
fall short along one or more of these dimensions.
We introduce Lumen, an access control scheme providing security, fault
isolation, and efficient shared memory to any number of threads within a
single address space. Lumen uses a new concurrent interval skip list (ISL)
to scalably maintain and query a set of memory region descriptors contain-
ing permissions information. We describe a permissions and ownership sys-
tem for memory regions that allows safe delegation of privileges between
protection domains for sandboxing and software reusability purposes. We
describe the LumenCache, which caches region permissions to avoid most
ISL lookups. We discuss applications of Lumen in debugging, security, and
reliability, and extensions to use Lumen for prefetching, profiling, and user-
facing memory management features. Lumen offers scalable, flexible mem-
ory access control and the ability to trade off security, system reliability, and
performance in a way not possible with existing solutions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Memory access control has a profound impact on the performance, reliabil-
ity, and flexibility of complex applications, particularly when data is shared
among threads. The de facto mechanism for access control enforcement, vir-
tual memory, forces a dichotomy between multi-threaded and multi-process
models. Threads in the same process can share data at any granularity with-
out copying, but no mechanisms exist to selectively share parts of an address
space, requiring complete mutual trust between threads. Threads in different
processes can use shared memory regions for selective zero-copy sharing, but
cannot transparently share pointer-based data structures. Shared memory
regions are restricted to page-granularity objects with inflexible semantics,
which limits the flexibility and composability of the software that uses them.
Modern processors base access control on virtual memory mechanisms, fun-
damentally limiting the granularity at which data can be protected or shared
and forcing programmers to compromise on memory efficiency or protection.
Several flexible and fine-grained sharing and protection schemes have been
proposed in the literature, but suffer from high overhead or fragile semantics.
We introduce Lumen, a mechanism that supports arbitrarily fine-grained
and flexible data sharing and protection between threads, and can function
alongside or instead of virtual memory. Lumen performs well and provides
much more flexible and composable semantics, encouraging software to make
heavier use of memory protection.
The contributions of this thesis include:
1. Lumen, a novel memory protection mechanism that enables flexible,
fine-grained, scalable protection
2. The first concurrent interval skip list, to our knowledge
3. The LumenCache, an interval metadata cache enabling Lumen im-
plementations to achieve high performance at low hardware cost
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4. A characterization of the address space complexity of modern personal,
professional, and mobile computers
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The performance and programmability of a computing system is increasingly
determined by its mechanisms for sharing data among threads. Hardware
is becoming more parallel to extract increased system throughput in spite
of plateauing single-thread performance. Programs are increasingly multi-
threaded in order to provide user interface responsiveness via concurrency,
and to maximize performance via parallelism. More sophisticated user needs
and an industry trend toward virtual server consolidation mean that mod-
ern machines are also running an increasing number of concurrent processes.
Many of these processes also share data with one another, including library
code and common memory-mapped files to conserve system memory, and
shared memory segments for inter-process communication (IPC). A mecha-
nism for sharing data between threads should therefore provide high perfor-
mance and scalability while preserving process isolation and imposing as few
programming model constraints as possible.
The memory management unit (MMU), translation lookaside buffers (TLB),
and page tables on nearly all modern microprocessors combine to provide
three key features for application developers and users: memory permis-
sions, virtualization of physical memory, and memory mapping.
These three features ensure isolation between multiple processes, enable com-
pilation without regard for the target’s physical memory capacity or organi-
zation, and enable efficient and safe memory-mapped I/O and IPC. However,
page-granularity virtual memory presents a semantic gap between the pro-
grammer’s protection and sharing goals and the implementation of those
goals by the operating system and hardware [1].
The vast majority of multitasking systems today provide process isola-
tion, shared memory between processes, and memory-mapped I/O using the
virtual memory page table. Since the hardware implementation of these
mechanisms is so similar even across processor architectures, the mecha-
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nisms can be exposed to software through standard application programmer
interfaces (APIs). Most UNIX-based operating systems use the mmap() and
mprotect() to allocate and manage permissions on memory regions, respec-
tively. While these low-level primitives are sufficient to implement shared
memory regions between processes, most of these operating systems also pro-
vide higher level APIs conforming to the POSIX or System V specifications.
Windows provides VirtualAlloc() and VirtualProtect() as analogs to
mmap() and mprotect(), respectively.
We now describe the most common hardware implementation of process
isolation and shared memory regions. Each process is assigned its own vir-
tual address space and page table, and memory belonging to other processes
is inaccessible by virtue of being unaddressable. Two zero-copy mechanisms
exist to share a data structure between N threads of control: multithreading
and operating system (OS)-managed shared memory regions. Both mecha-
nisms have significant drawbacks under virtual memory. Placing threads in
the same process gives them unlimited access to each other’s memory, which
is undesirable for security and reliability. Placing threads in separate pro-
cesses and placing the data structure in a shared memory region has three
disadvantages:
1. Processes cannot share or set permissions on memory at a sub-page
granularity.
2. Data structures with pointers cannot generally be shared transparently,
since the system cannot guarantee that all processes will map the region
at the same virtual address.
3. The shared region is represented in each process’ page table, resulting
in increased storage overhead, region modification latency, and TLB
pressure.
The first limitation can be worked around to some extent by laboriously
splitting program data into regions with common sharing properties and
permissions. Pointer swizzling has been used in databases and distributed
shared memory systems to share pointer-based data structures [2]. Both
techniques carry a large performance and complexity cost.
Page-granularity protection forces a fundamental tradeoff between perfor-
mance and protection. We use a cycle-accurate, execution-driven simula-
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tor [3] to evaluate the TLB behavior of a suite of data- and task-parallel
benchmarks [4]. Figures 2.1(a) and 2.1(c) characterize many-core L1 TLB
performance versus TLB size and page size, respectively. The small page
sizes desired for low fragmentation and fine-grained protection require cor-
respondingly large TLBs to achieve the desired miss rate of less than one
percent.
2.1 Goals and Requirements
The high-level goals of Lumen are to enable fine-grained memory protection
and sharing, to achieve high performance and scalability, and place as few
constraints on application programmers as possible in terms of data layout
and code structure. Each of these goals leads to a small set of core design
requirements that guide our proof-of-concept implementation.
In order to achieve fine-grained memory protection and sharing, Lumen
breaks from the page frame-centric model imposed by virtual memory and
specifies memory region protection and sharing properties explicitly, a model
more similar to segments. Memory segmentation, a model first used on the
Burroughs B5000 [5], divides memory into semantically separate segments,
and each memory operation is expressed as a segment identifier and a byte
offset within the segment. Segmentation can be used to virtualize memory
by relocating segments transparently within a larger address space, and to
prevent a thread from addressing memory outside its assigned segments.
However, unlike traditional segment implementations, Lumen must support
the dynamic creation, destruction, and modification of arbitrarily nested
segments. The binding between a memory instruction and the segment it
refers to must therefore happen at runtime, as opposed to binding memory
instructions to segment registers at compile time. Segment-agnostic memory
instructions and pointers have the additional benefit of enabling segment-
agnostic code to be used on data from many segments [6].
Abstractly, we conceptualize permissions and sharing metadata as a hi-
erarchical collection of intervals; each interval consists of an address range
and a function encoding the permissions each thread in the system has on
that address range. To simplify queries, page tables and existing fine-grained
segment schemes [7, 8] flatten the interval metadata along one or more di-
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mensions; that is, they store a single set of permissions per address and do
not necessarily preserve the high-level structure of the permissions informa-
tion. This flattening has two disadvantages. First, it introduces duplication
which leads to performance and storage overhead; for example, N processes
sharing an M -page region under virtual memory lead to MN -way transla-
tion and permissions duplication. Second, flattened representations typically
throw away information about the interval itself after its data is replicated,
losing the ability to add and remove intervals dynamically with consistent
semantics. For example, consider a case where a thread has read-write per-
missions on the interval [0,100], temporarily marks [30, 70] as read-only,
then removes the read-only interval. Ideally, when the interval is removed,
[30,70] would automatically become read-write again, but flattened repre-
sentations discard information about the previous permissions. As a result,
applications must either explicitly track hierarchical permissions information
themselves or compromise security and reliability by adopting more permis-
sive protection policies.
Another disadvantage of virtual memory-based protection is that it forces
a strict dichotomy between multi-threaded and multi-process models. Threads
in the same process enjoy flexible, zero-copy data sharing, but must grant
one another full permissions to the entire address space. Threads in different
processes have tighter control over permissions, but must communicate either
through slow IPC channels or shared memory regions which may be mapped
at different virtual addresses, making it difficult to share pointer-based data
structures. Our goal with Lumen is to enable a thread to grant access to
shared memory regions on a region-by-region, thread-by-thread basis. The
ability to get the best of the multi-threading and multi-process programming
models will allow developers to use shared memory and memory protection
more pervasively, improving the overall performance and reliability of future
computer systems.
While virtual memory offers fixed performance and fixed protection granu-
larity for a given page size, Lumen allows application developers and users to
trade off access control granularity and performance. The tradeoff chosen can
vary between applications, or for a single application over its development
lifecycle; the developer can use very fine-grained protection as a debugging
mechanism, then improve performance over time by doing coarser-grained
checking as the program becomes more reliable. Users can also perform this
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tradeoff to fit their security, performance, and reliability needs if applications
expose mechanisms to increase or reduce the strictness of Lumen intervals.
In the limit, a system running completely trusted software may grant all
threads full permission to the full address space with a single interval; the
interval metadata can be trivially cached, and Lumen’s runtime overhead
goes to zero.
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CHAPTER 3
LUMEN
In this chapter, we describe the design and implementation of Lumen, a
flexible, efficient data structure for storing and querying memory interval
metadata, including permissions.
3.1 Data Structure
Lumen must support efficient queries and updates on a set of intervals repre-
senting memory regions, stored as <StartByteAddress, EndByteAddress,
Metadata> tuples. The metadata must include read-write-execute permis-
sions for all threads in the system, but may include other information, as
discussed in Section 5. We call each tuple an interval descriptor. The data
structure used to index interval descriptors must efficiently find all inter-
vals that intersect a query interval corresponding to the bytes accessed by a
memory operation.
Many data structures have been proposed for indexing intervals efficiently,
including the interval tree [9], the segment tree [10], and the radix priority
search tree [11]. For Lumen, we impose the additional constraint that the
data structure be dynamic; to be useful in a running system, it must support
efficient interval insertion and deletion at runtime. The best known bounds
for the general case of interval intersection queries on a dynamic dataset
are O(n lg(n)) space and O(lg2(n) + k) time, where n is the total number of
intervals and k is the number of matching intervals returned by the query [12].
However, for Lumen, the query interval’s size is bounded by the maximum
load or store width of the machine, W . We can take advantage of this fact
to reduce the time bound to O(lg(n) + k +W ).
While several tree-based structures achieve the optimal time and space
bounds, trees must be kept balanced to maintain logarithmic search time.
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These balancing operations are often global in scope, reducing concurrency
by locking large portions of the tree. We therefore focus our attention on
data structures based on the skip list [13]. A skip list stores a set of sorted
items using a linked list; each node contains a key and an array of at least one
forward pointer. The first forward pointer, called level 0, implements a linked
list of all nodes in sorted order. Any additional pointers are linked together by
level and constitute shortcuts to nodes further down the list, reducing query
time from O(n) to O(lg(n). Skip lists maintain balance probabilistically and
without global operations by assigning a random number of forward pointers
to each node at insertion time. To find a key K, start at the top level of the
header node and follow all forward pointers at that level until the forward
pointer sink node’s key is greater than K. Once such a pointer has been
found, drop down one level and repeat the process until key K is found or
a key greater than K is found on level 0, indicating that K is not stored in
the skip list.
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Hanson and Johnson introduced the interval skip list (ISL) [14], an ex-
tension to the skip list for finding all intervals that intersect a query point.
Lumen uses an ISL, as shown in Figure 3.1b, and modifies the query proce-
dure to allow a small query interval with the aforementioned optimal time
and space bounds.
An ISL is a skip list with a node for each unique interval endpoint and a set
of interval markers associated with each node and forward pointer; a marker
is simply a pointer to an interval descriptor. We describe the layout of each
interval descriptor in Section 3.2. Lumen’s ISL stores intervals on the set of
integer byte addresses, so each node’s key corresponds to the byte address of
the endpoint of one or more intervals. We denote an interval with endpoints
A and B as [A,B], and a forward pointer between two nodes with keys X and
Y as [X, Y ]. To insert an interval I = [A,B], we place markers for I on all
forward pointers [X, Y ] in the ISL such that I contains [X, Y ] and no other
forward pointer exists that lies within I and contains [X, Y ]. Hanson and
Johnson call these two conditions containment and maximality. For each
marked forward pointer [X, Y ], we also place a marker on nodes X and Y if
they are within I. To find all intervals containing a point K, we traverse the
nodes and forward pointers as if searching for K in a skip list. Whenever
we drop from level i to level i− 1, we add all markers on the level i forward
pointer of the current node to the list of intersecting intervals. At the end
of the search, if we find node K, we add its markers to the list; otherwise,
we add the markers on the level 0 pointer of the last node with key less than
K. The containment and maximality conditions guarantee that the list of
intervals intersecting point K is complete and contains no duplicates. This
point-interval intersection query is known as a stabbing query, and is shown
in the first part of Algorithm 1.
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For Lumen to be an efficient protection mechanism for modern systems,
the ISL must be able to check permissions on a small contiguous byte range
without performing individual stabbing queries for each byte. Such a facility
is necessary to support word-wide memory accesses and per-byte permissions.
We present an extension to the ISL that allows intersection queries with small
query intervals. For a Lumen query with an interval [K,K +W ], we search
for K using the stabbing query procedure outlined above, then continue
traversing along level 0 until we find a key greater than or equal to K +W ,
picking up markers on each node and all its forward pointers as we go. We call
this second phase of the query the conflict phase. We compute permissions
exactly for the first byte in the interval during the stabbing query phase;
for subsequent bytes, we merely check to see if any enclosing intervals have
permissions that contradict the first byte’s (i.e., a needed permission is set
to ‘1’ in the first byte and to ‘0’ on one or more subsequent bytes). This
more relaxed check during the conflict phase is necessary for the interval
intersection query to be performed in constant space since, unlike in the
stabbing query phase, we may encounter duplicate intervals and intervals
are not guaranteed to be ordered by size.
If any byte in the interval does not have the required permissions to satisfy
the read, write, or execute access, Lumen throws a segmentation fault or
equivalent error to the accessing program.
Since loads and stores under Lumen seldom cross protection interval bound-
aries, there will often be no nodes or markers between K and K + W , but
if there are, markers picked up in the conflict phase may contain duplicates.
We address this complication in Section 3.5.2.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for finding all intervals in an ISL
intersecting a small query interval.
To insert a node N with level forward pointers:
• Search forN.key and build up a list update[level-1:0], where update[i]
is the node that will point to N at level i
• Remove all markers on forward pointers that will point to N , place
them in a set S
• Update forward pointers in and out of N
• For each interval I = [X, Y ] in S, place markers for I along the search
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Algorithm 1 Find all intervals intersecting [K,K +W ] in an ISL isl:
n← isl.header {Stabbing Query Phase}
for l = isl.maxlevel to 1 do
while n.next[l].key ≤ K do
n← n.next[l]
m← m ∪ n.markers[l]
while n.next[0].key ≤ K do
n← n.next[0]
while n.key < K +W {Conflict Phase} do
m← m ∪ n.nodemarkers ∪ n.markers[(n.level − 1) : 0]
for i = 0 to n.level − 1 do
m← m ∪ n.node
if n.key == K +W then
m← m ∪ n.nodemarkers
else
m← m ∪ n.markers[0]
return m
path from max(update[level − 1].key,X.key) to min(update[level −
1].next[level − 1].key, Y.key)
To insert an interval I = [X, Y ]:
• Insert X, if not present
• Insert Y , if not present
• Place markers for I along the search path from X to Y
We refer the reader to Hanson and Johnson’s paper [14] for the full node
and interval insertion and deletion procedures.
In this work, we augment the query, insertion, and removal procedures to
support concurrent accesses efficiently, as described in Section 3.3.
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3.2 Permissions
While Lumen allows the attachment of arbitrary metadata with any seman-
tics to a memory interval, we describe a permissions scheme that improves
flexibility and composability for programmers over the per-process RWX bits
used in page table-based memory protection.
An ISL can store multiple intervals covering a single address; separate
intervals should be used to represent semantically meaningful memory re-
gions, like a thread’s stack, a memory-mapped file region, or a member of
a C struct. These regions tend to be hierarchical; that is, the protection
intervals we want to insert tend to be subintervals of one another, where an
interval J = [C,D] is a subinterval of I = [A,B] iff A ≤ C ≤ D ≤ B. Fur-
thermore, it is difficult to reconcile conflicting permissions on non-hierarchical
intervals. Consider two overlapping intervals, X = [0, 12] with read-write
permissions and Y = [8, 20] with no permissions; without a complex and
fragile notion of per-interval priority, the permissions on address 10 cannot
be determined. We therefore enforce the condition that an interval can only
be inserted into the ISL if it contains, is contained by, or does not overlap
with every other interval in the ISL. More formally, for any two intervals
a = [La, Ra] and b = [Lb, Rb], Lb ∈ [La, Ra] ⇔ Rb ∈ [La, Ra]. We call this
condition the pyramid constraint, a reference to the pyramid-like shapes in
the abstract representation of the ISL as shown in Figure 3.1a, with smaller
intervals above larger ones. With this constraint, the intervals covering a
given address can be sorted by size; smaller, and thus more specific, intervals
take precedence over larger ones, regardless of the order in which they were
inserted.
To further decouple intervals from one another, we allow an interval to
specify partial permissions. That is, we allow an interval to defer to the
next largest enclosing interval for one or more RWX permissions, rather
than require each interval to set all permissions explicitly. We encode RWX
permissions with 2 bits each and allow three states: ‘1’, ‘0’, and ‘X’ (de-
fer). As an example, if an interval I = [20, 30] has permissions 1X0 and
J = [10, 40] has permissions 011, I defers to J for write permissions and ad-
dress 10–40 have permissions 110. This ability to specify partial permissions
is analogous to inheritance in object-oriented programming, and allows sep-
aration of concerns between intervals; libraries and applications can manage
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their intervals largely in isolation, with predictable results even when they
share data. In contrast, under page-based protection, the flattened nature
of the permissions data necessitates close cooperation between all entities
that manage permissions on a given address; this required cooperation limits
the programmer’s ability to compose multiple permissions-aware libraries or
applications. Partial permissions can also improve the performance of per-
mission management operations. If many small intervals defer to a common
enclosing interval for a certain permission, simply modifying that permission
on the parent will implicitly propagate the change to all subintervals. Beyond
just a performance increase, it allows the permissions for large memory re-
gions to be changed atomically, a new capability with interesting implications
for security, reliability, and synchronization primitives in parallel systems.
To ensure system reliability and security in the face of untrusted or buggy
software, a shared memory mechanism must allow a set of threads to del-
egate permissions on a memory region to other threads on a fine-grained
basis while maintaining ultimate control of the region. The virtualization
extensions found on many modern microprocessors enable a limited form
of such delegation between host and guest operating systems [15]. Existing
shared memory APIs either provide no ownership semantics and assume fully
cooperative threads (e.g., anonymous mmap()), or treat memory regions as
files and provide semantics akin to UNIX filesystem permissions or access
control lists (ACLs). Since the virtual memory hardware does not support
either permission model natively, they are enforced in software by the op-
erating system, requiring expensive page table scans and TLB shootdowns
when permissions are changed. Additionally, under OS-managed permissions
schemes, a memory region is treated as a single file, so permissions cannot
be changed dynamically on part of a region. In Lumen, we support a form
of the stronger model, ACLs, natively in each interval’s metadata, provid-
ing more fine-grained, flexible, and performant protection than is available
today.
Each interval’s descriptor contains an ACL, specified as a set of <ThreadSetID,
OwnershipLevel[1:0], MaxPermissions[5:0], CurrentPermissions[5:0],
CreatorLevel[1:0]> tuples, as shown in Figure 3.1c. In our implementa-
tion, we encode this set as a linked list of 64-bit values and leave the investi-
gation of a more dense encoding to future work. Thread sets have no access
to an address unless they are specified in the ACL of an interval covering that
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address. Each thread set in the ACL has a set of maximum RWX permissions
and a set of current permissions, which it can modify freely as long as they do
not exceed the maximum permissions. We rank the three permissions states
from greatest to least as ‘1’, ‘X’, ‘0’; if any element of an RWX permission set
P1 is higher than the corresponding element of P2 in that ranking, P1 is said
to exceed P2. If a thread is a member of multiple thread sets specified in a
single interval ACL, the thread can assume the most lenient of all associated
RWX permissions. The maximum permissions are set when the permissions
tuple is inserted. The OwnershipLevel field establishes a hierarchy of rights
holders, with higher-numbered levels denoting fewer rights. Only a single
thread set can be at ownership level 0 for a given address; this thread set is
called the owner and must be specified in the largest interval enclosing the
address. A thread set with ownership level L and maximum permissions P
on an interval I can perform the following actions:
• Set current permissions ≤ P on I and access addresses in the interval
with those permissions
• Add subintervals of I satisfying the pyramid constraint
• Add permissions tuples for itself or other thread sets on I or its subin-
tervals, setting MaxPermissions≤ P and CreatorLevel≥ L
• Modify or remove permissions tuples with MaxPermissions≤ P and
CreatorLevel≥ L on I or its subintervals
• Remove I or a subinterval of I if the interval to be removed has no
subintervals and no attached permissions tuples
These rules allow permissions to be delegated easily by any thread, while
preventing direct or indirect privilege escalation and protecting permissions
granted by a thread from being modified by less privileged threads. In our
implementation, we allocate two ownership level bits per permission tuple,
allowing four distinct levels. While two levels are sufficient to implement
the usual kernel/userspace ownership hierarchy, additional levels give appli-
cations and libraries the new ability to safely delegate control over regions of
memory to non-cooperative or even malicious threads.
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Thread Sets Our implementation allows up to 216 threads and 248 thread
sets in the system. Thread set 248 − 1 is reserved as a wildcard; an interval
descriptor may refer to this thread set to apply permissions globally, with
the caveat that the wildcard thread set cannot have ownership level 0. When
a thread is spawned and assigned a thread ID t, it is also assigned a default
thread set with ID t, with itself as the only member. The thread may then use
thread set t immediately for private data or add other threads to it; the latter
case simulates a multithreaded process in a traditional operating system.
Thread set 216 is reserved for the operating system. Thread set membership
is encoded in two data structures. Each thread has a chunked linked list of
thread sets of which it is a member. Each thread set has a chunked linked
list of the contiguous thread ID ranges of its members, as shown in Figure
3.1d. Encoding a thread set’s members as contiguous ranges optimizes for
the common case of sharing occurring within tight cliques of threads, as is
the case in today’s multithreaded processes; these cliques should attempt
to allocate contiguous thread IDs from the operating system for maximum
encoding efficiency.
3.3 Concurrency
If we are to encourage libraries and applications to make more aggressive use
of permissions mechanisms, the mechanisms must perform well in the highly
parallel systems being built and designed today. In practice, this means that
Lumen should follow the trend in modern operating systems of favoring
fine-grained locking and lock-free synchronization in shared data structures
wherever possible.
We experimented with several synchronization strategies for Lumen, and
settled on a hybrid of fine-grained locking and lock-free operations. Lock-free
synchronization primitives on modern processors provide excellent scalability
by shrinking critical sections to a single cycle in many cases. These primitives
are usually implemented by using cache coherence mechanisms to prevent in-
tervening accesses during the atomic operation, or by serializing operations
through dedicated functional units located at a central location such as the
last level cache. Therefore, though hardware atomic operations provide much
higher throughput than small critical sections protected by locks, each indi-
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vidual atomic operation is significantly slower than its non-atomic equivalent.
In data structures with complex invariants like the ISL, the high-level op-
eration to be performed concurrently can be complex, and although it can
be broken down into a sequence of atomic operations in some cases, such a
sequence may in fact be slower and more error-prone than lock-based synchro-
nization, particularly in situations with low contention. Several concurrent
skip lists have been proposed in the literature [16, 17, 18], but skip lists are
fundamentally easier to make lock-free than interval skip lists. In particu-
lar, the forward pointers in a skip list are purely performance hints, and a
lock-free skip list may lose forward pointers without impacting correctness;
indeed, the implementation used in Java’s ConcurrentSkipListMap class
acknowledges this explicitly [16]. In contrast, precise forward pointer and
marker placement is critical to ISL correctness, and inserting or removing an
interval requires a large number of markers to logically update consistently
and atomically. We thus place read-write locks on each node to prevent ISL
modifications from conflicting and to prevent queries from observing incon-
sistent state. These locks allow either one writer or an arbitrary number
of readers to access a node simultaneously. All operations acquire locks in
increasing order of keys, or left to right in the abstract ISL representation in
Figure 3.1a; this strategy prevents deadlock, and is similar to Herlihy et al.’s
suggestion to define such a total order on skip list node locks [19].
When inserting or deleting a node X, the scope of potentially affected ISL
nodes and edges is from the source node of the top edge into X to the sink
node of the top edge out of X. We write-lock all nodes in this range while up-
dating pointers and markers surrounding the node of interest. When a node
X is deleted, all nodes pointing to X are write-locked, so no other threads
can hold references to X and X’s memory can be reclaimed immediately.
Figure 3.2 shows the results of 1 billion trials of random ISLs of several sizes.
The mean operation locks 3.3 nodes for a 4-node ISL and 21.9 nodes for a
2-million-node ISL. The 95th and 99th percentile operations level off at 29
and 145 locks, respectively, at 2 million nodes. Statistically, insertions and
deletions seldom lock a significant portion of the ISL, and absolute overhead
is low even for the very complex ISLs found in debugging situations. Node
insertions and deletions will block some reads from proceeding past them, but
reads can bypass the write-locked nodes if they traverse a shortcut pointer
at a higher level than the node being inserted or removed. In general, due to
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Figure 3.2: Mean, 95th percentile, and 99th percentile number of nodes
locked for ISL node insertions and deletions vs. ISL size.
the height distribution of nodes, write-locked nodes seldom block concurrent
reads to unrelated addresses.
Queries and the marker insertion phase of interval insertion proceed using
hand-over-hand read locking, without acquiring any node write locks. To
traverse an ISL edge from source to sink, start by read-holding source.lock,
read-acquire sink.lock, traverse the edge, and read-release source.lock.
Bit 0 of an interval first permissions tuple’s next pointer is used as a flag,
manipulated with atomic compare-and-swap, denoting whether (0) or not
(1) the interval is logically inserted into the ISL. The flag is reset at the very
end of interval insertions and set at the very beginning of interval deletions.
Queries ignore intervals if their flag is set.
To optimize the ISL for the common case, queries, we store the markers on
each forward pointer and node as a singly linked list, where readers can pro-
ceed without any locking and writers must acquire a spinlock. Since readers
are lock-free, a marker’s memory cannot be freed until no readers have refer-
ences to it. This problem is called scalable memory reclamation (SMR) in the
context of parallel systems, and is common to nearly all lock-free data struc-
tures. While many solutions exist, we use a variant of Fraser’s epoch-based
reclamation (EBR) [20] termed new EBR (NEBR) by Hart et al [21]. All
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SMR solutions reclaim memory when it can be proven that no thread holds
a reference to that memory. In EBR, a global epoch counter is incremented
periodically, and participating threads observe the epoch number when they
begin a critical section which may acquire a reference to the memory covered
by EBR. Each thread maintains a global variable recording the last observed
epoch number; if a piece of memory is removed from the data structure during
epoch X, it may be reclaimed once all threads have observed a subsequent
epoch E > X. The developer of an EBR-based data structure may vary
the way the epoch counter is incremented and the size of the EBR-protected
code section to trade off performance and reclamation latency. NEBR is a
coarse-grained variant of EBR for data structures where a single high-level
operation encompasses many small critical sections; in Lumen, rather than
observing the epoch for each marker list reference, a thread only observes the
epoch once per high-level query, insertion, or removal operation, improving
performance significantly.
3.4 Hardware/Software Interface
At a high-level, Lumen operates similarly to page-based protection; it in-
tercepts all memory accesses at the core to verify that the issuing thread
has the required permissions on the bytes being accessed. Insufficient per-
missions will cause a signal to be sent asynchronously to the issuing thread,
which can attempt to recover or exit.
Lumen can be employed in two ways: a single system-wide ISL covering all
kernel and user threads in a single address space operating system (SASOS),
or on top of virtual memory mechanisms with a separate ISL for each virtual
address space. When the ISL is initialized, a single interval is inserted giving
the controlling thread set ownership level 0 and full permissions on the entire
address space. The memory used for the ISL itself is part of the address
space. The operating system can set permissions on these allocation arenas
to either force all ISL operations to be mediated by the operating system
or trusted hardware walker, or allow some operations to proceed fully in
userspace, according to the system’s performance and reliability goals. Table
3.1 summarizes the differences between the SASOS and per-address-space
implementations.
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Table 3.1: Properties of single address space operating system and
per-virtual-address-space Lumen implementations. Implementations with
one ISL per virtual address space may trade off performance for reliability
by allowing some ISL modifications or queries to occur in userspace.
SASOS ISL Per Virtual Address Space
ISL initialized at boot process creation
Controlling TSet OS parent thread
Permissions for
other threads
on ISL memory
None None or read-only
ISL modified by OS OS or parent thread
ISL queried by
OS or
HW walker
Any thread or
HW walker
Lumen does not require any ISA extensions to operate efficiently. In
systems with low security and reliability needs, trusted software, or a trusted
compiler, the ability to tag memory instructions as requiring or not requiring
ISL lookup would increase performance. Table 3.2 outlines our proof of
concept API.
3.5 Caching
Programs often exhibit very high temporal locality in the memory regions
they access [22, 23]. Just as TLBs as necessary for performant virtual mem-
ory, for Lumen to be usable in a high-performance system, permissions must
be cached at the core to minimize per-memory-access latency. Caching per-
missions also speeds up those operations which do have to traverse the ISL
by reducing contention. In this section, we introduce the LumenCache, a
novel hardware cache for interval metadata.
The LumenCache consists of two content-associative memories (CAMs):
an interval cache and a thread set membership cache (TSCache). Figure 3.3
illustrates the structure of the interval cache.
The interval cache is logically an array of comparators. A na¨ıve imple-
mentation using static CMOS comparators would likely suffice for a small
interval cache, but would carry significant overhead for large numbers of en-
tries because traditional comparators are large and ill-suited to a dense array
implementation. We therefore construct the interval cache using a variant of
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Table 3.2: The Lumen API may be implemented as system calls or a
library, depending on the desired level of performance and protection.
struct PermissionsTuple{ uint64 t tsid : 48, creator level : 2, own level : 2,
max perms : 6, cur perms : 6}
IntervalHandle insert interval(void *low addr, void *high addr, Permission-
sTuple perms[]
Inserts an interval with permissions for the specified TSets; returns a pointer to the
interval desc., or NULL on failure
int remove interval(IntervalHandle handle)
Removes the given interval; returns 0 on success, -1 on failure
int modify interval perms(IntervalHandle handle, PermissionsTuple
perms[])
Modifies (if present) or adds (if not) permissions tuples for the specified TSets; returns
-1 if any TSets failed
remove interval perms(IntervalHandle handle, uint64 t thread sets[])
Removes permissions tuples for the specified TSets; returns -1 if any TSets failed
IntervalHandle[] get intersecting intervals(void *low addr, void *high addr)
Get the set of intervals which intersect [low addr, high addr] and have a permissions
tuple pertaining to the issuing thread
int get perms(void *low addr, void *high addr)
Get the final computed permissions for [low addr, high addr] for the issuing thread;
returns -1 if permissions are inconsistent
void set permfault handler(void (*handler)(void *addr, int re-
quested perms, int computed perms))
For per-VA-space Lumen implementation, set the address of the handler used for per-
missions faults
SASOS implementations of Lumen use the existing signal handling infrastructure and
deliver permissions faults via SIGSEGV
Table 3.3: Area complexity of CMOS comparators. Complexity includes
one 6T SRAM cell per bit. Complexity does not include buffers used to
improve timing, but buffers should add a small, relatively equal overhead to
all designs. TG stands for transmission gate, and PT stands for pass
transistor. PG and PG∗ are specialized propagate-generate circuits [24].
Architecture Components (N -bit) XTORS XTORS
(N =
64)
Static, Serial [25] N(4NOT + XOR + 2NAND +
2TG + PT + SRAM)
39N 2496
Static, Parallel [26] N(NOT+AND+SRAM)+(N−
1)(OR + 2TG) + (N − lg(N) −
1)(2TG + NOT )
30N −
6lg(N)−
16
1868
Static, Prefix-adder [24] N(XOR+SRAM) + N−12 (PG+
PG∗)
32N −
14
2034
Static, RMC [27] N(2TG+1NOT+6PT+SRAM) 18N 1152
Dynamic, RMC [27] N(9PT + SRAM) 15N 960
Static, reduced-area RMC N(2TG+1NOT+4PT+SRAM) 16N 1024
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Figure 3.3: Interval cache and reduced-area range-matching cell structure.
Matchline drivers, buffers, and keepers vary with process technology and
are not shown.
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the Range-Matching Cell (RMC) proposed by Kim et al. [27]. The RMC is
an efficient matchline-based comparator originally developed for port range
matching in networking applications. An RMC takes roughly 80% of the
area and 2× the search power of a static NAND-type ternary CAM (TCAM)
cell. Table 3.3 shows that an RMC-based CAM is significantly more dense
than other complementary and transmission gate-based CMOS implementa-
tions. The reduced-area static matchline RMC introduced in this work uses
45-59% fewer transistors than the other organizations. The RMC-based or-
ganizations are also more amenable to a regular array organization than the
parallel and prefix-adder implementations, since each cell only connects to
its immediate neighbors.
Kim et al. present two versions of the RMC, both using a pass transistor
on the matchline between MLin and MLout. A CAM using the dynamic
matchline RMC precharges the match-line before each search, and one or
more RMCs can pull the match-line low to signal a mismatch. In contrast,
the static matchline RMC can actively drive MLout high or low if its value can
be determined independently of MLin. The static version requires three more
transistors per cell and is less symmetrical, but has several advantages over
the dynamic version. Dynamic logic circuits precharge a storage node dur-
ing the precharge phase, then allow the pull-down network to either pull the
storage node down to a logic ‘0’ or not during the evaluation phase. Two im-
portant phenomena that adversely impact dynamic logic are charge sharing
and leakage [28]. Charge sharing occurs when one or more of the pull-down
transistors are on; the charge on the storage node is split among the stor-
age node capacitance and the capacitances of the ‘on’ transistors, reducing
the voltage on the storage node and negatively impacting evaluation speed
and/or correctness. Leakage occurs when the charge on the storage unit dis-
sipates through parasitic resistances over time, also reducing the voltage on
the storage node. Both of these phenomena have become more prominent in
deep submicron technologies, making static matchlines much more attractive
on these technology nodes. If desired, a designer can mitigate these disad-
vantages of dynamic logic by inserting extra keeper transistors to decrease
leakage and buffer the match-line every few cells to mitigate charge sharing
and increase speed. Another advantage of the static match-line scheme is
that it only charges a segment of the match-line if the cell matches, avoid-
ing the energy cost of unconditionally precharging the entire line for every
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search. Indeed, Kim et al. found that a 256x16-bit static match-line CAM
was 33% larger and 20% slower than the most optimized dynamic version,
but also used 35% less energy per search. For the small array sizes we an-
ticipate for a first-level LumenCache, the static RMC presents a favorable
tradeoff. We reduce the overhead of the static RMC over the dynamic RMC
to only one transistor per cell by removing two transistors used only in the
equality operation.
Though Figure 3.3 shows a static matchline, either architecture can be
used; a small LumenCache can use static matchlines to reduce power, and
a large LumenCache can use dynamic matchlines to minimize search time.
A block of n RMCs, called a Range Matching Block (RMB), can perform
n-bit equals (EQ), less than or equal to (LEQ), and greater than or
equal to (GEQ) operations between a search word and a word stored in the
per-RMC SRAM cells. Each interval cache entry consists of a pointer-sized
RMB for each endpoint of the cached interval, a thread set ID, and the
computed RWX permissions for that thread set. By tagging entries with
thread set IDs, we allow threads in the same protection domain to share
entries and avoid flushing the interval cache at context switches.
Since threads may belong to multiple thread sets at a time, we also main-
tain the TSCache, a small (2-8 entries) secondary cache of thread set IDs of
which the running thread is a member. The thread set ID cache is kept con-
sistent by conservatively flushing it on rare thread set membership changes.
To search the LumenCache for a memory access to bytes [X, Y ], con-
figure the interval cache’s start and end RMBs to perform LEQ X and GEQ
Y operations, respectively. If both RMBs in an entry match, the interval
cache will output that entry’s set ID and permissions. We then search the
TSCache to see if the requesting thread belongs to the relevant thread set. If
the TSCache misses, we search the thread’s membership list. If the thread set
ID is found, it is filled into the TSCache and the permissions from the inter-
val cache are used. If not, or if the interval cache misses, we query the ISL to
find the permissions for the query interval. During this query, the TSCache
is used to quickly determine which covering interval descriptors are relevant
to the thread. The smallest enclosing interval, calculated permissions, and
applicable thread set ID are then filled into the interval cache.
All interval insertions, deletions, and permissions changes occur through
the in-memory ISL, not the interval caches. To keep all interval caches con-
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sistent, all ISL modifications broadcast a shootdown for the affected interval.
For queries, we could further reduce interval cache area by specializing each
RMB to only perform either LEQ or GEQ operations. However, by only remov-
ing the EQ capability, we still reduce area compared to the baseline RMC and
can support 3-cycle flash invalidation of an arbitrary interval in the entire
cache. A cached interval [A,B] should be invalidated on a shootdown for
interval [C,D] iff (C ≤ A∧B ≤ D)∨ (A ≤ C ∧C ≤ B)∨ (A ≤ D∧D ≤ B).
This reduction in shootdown overhead from linear time to three cycles is
critical for supporting large interval caches or frequent permissions changes.
Excessive shootdown traffic still increases ISL modification latency and net-
work congestion; Villavieja et al. [29] found that TLB shootdowns caused
slowdowns of up to 2× for the apache webserver at 128 cores. Therefore,
system designers may choose to reduce shootdown traffic by tracking which
LumenCaches are caching which intervals in a directory; directories are
commonly used for data caches, and Villavieja et al. proposed their use for
TLBs.
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Table 3.4: Estimated fully associative TLB and LumenCache area
Entries Area (45nm)
TLB (Fully Associative)
8 1290 µm2
16 1940 µm2
32 2740 µm2
64 4470 µm2
LumenCache
4 800 µm2
8 1600 µm2
16 3190 µm2
32 6450 µm2
64 12870 µm2
3.5.1 Area Estimation
Table 3.4 shows the estimated area of a range of fully associative TLBs
and LumenCaches. TLBs are modeled as CAMs using CACTI [30], and
LumenCaches are modeled as SRAMs and RMCs using CACTI and na¨ıve
technology scaling from the 130nm process used in the original RMC pa-
per [27].
As LumenCache entries are more complex than typical page table entries
cached by a TLB, the per-entry cost is somewhat larger. For instance, a 16-
entry LumenCache is estimated to be between a 32- and 64-entry TLB in
area. Similarly, the LumenCache is expected to consume 2-3× as much
power per entry as a typical TLB. However, the LumenCache provides a
much greater potential reach per entry — up to the size of the entire address
space — and much greater flexibility in management of permissions. In a
common scenario where only a small number of intervals are in use, a small
LumenCache can easily capture nearly every lookup, whereas a much larger
TLB may still be unable to effectively capture all regions in use.
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3.5.2 Hardware Refill
Though interval insertion and deletion are relatively complex, we specifically
designed our ISL and concurrency strategy so that queries are simple, en-
abling a low-cost hardware LumenCache refill implementation, analogous
to the page table walkers found in high-performance systems today. Oﬄoad-
ing LumenCache refill to a hardware ISL walker improves energy and per-
formance relative to a software routine, reduces instruction cache pollution,
and enables multiple memory operations to proceed in parallel.
The ISL walker must be able to correctly compute the combined permis-
sions of any number of intervals covering an address. Due to partial per-
missions and the higher priority given to smaller intervals, intervals must
be processed from largest to smallest, or vice-versa.1 The ISL as proposed
by Hanson and Johnson does not guarantee that markers are picked up in
any particular order, so all intervals must be sorted before their permis-
sions can be combined. However, we find that in Lumen, intervals in the
initial stabbing query will be picked up from largest to smallest as long as
the marker lists at each node and forward pointer are sorted from largest
to smallest. We therefore add the requirement that all markers be inserted
into their respective lists in sorted order; this invariant is easy to maintain,
even under concurrency, because of the write locks on marker lists. We prove
that intervals are returned from largest to smallest in Appendix A. With
this requirement, permissions can be combined on-the-fly during the initial
stabbing query, without storing or sorting intervals. The ability to query the
ISL without sorting is beneficial even for a software implementation, but is
especially important for a hardware walker.
Intervals picked up in the conflict phase may contain duplicates or be out of
order, but since we only look for conflicting permissions on subsequent bytes
rather than computing permissions exactly, we can compare each interval’s
permissions against the first byte’s one by one, without storing or sorting
intervals. It is rare for a single memory access to span multiple intervals, so
the conflict phase will seldom require any action.
For an N -bit address space, an efficient ISL walker requires 13N + lgN
bits of state (421/838 bits for N = 32/64) and a modest amount of address
1The problem is analogous to alpha blending in computer graphics, as partially specified
permissions are analogous to transparency.
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Table 3.5: Required state for hardware traversal of a concurrent ISL.
# Bits Purpose
N Search Key
N Pointer to ISL structure
N Pointer to ISL header node
N Pointer to per-thread epoch structure
2N Temporary Variables
N Pointer to current node
lg(N) Current level
N Current node’s key
2N Lock addresses for hand-over-hand locking
N Currently computed interval descriptor state (N bits in our im-
plementation)
2N Low and high address of last encountered marker (optional, to
detect pyramid constraint violations)
generation and state machine logic. The required state variables are listed
in Table 3.5. Due to its small overhead, the walker is suitable even for small
embedded or accelerator cores where its energy and instruction cache benefits
are even more important.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
4.1 Address Space Complexity
To get a sense for Lumen’s performance when being used as a SASOS in a
real system, we gathered detailed data on the number and nature of virtual
memory intervals on a variety of real machines. We wrote a Linux kernel
module to gather system-wide snapshots of user- and kernel-space memory
maps by traversing kernel data structures and page tables. The results,
shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, are averaged across periodic snapshots
taken every minute for a period of one day. The main result is that Lumen
can store the same permissions information as virtual memory in 2.5×–10×
less space, due to its hierarchical, non-redundant nature. Also of note is that
25–75% of user-space virtual memory areas system-wide are duplicates, due
to common patterns like sharing code and reading common system files.
4.2 ISL Characterization
As ours is the first concurrent ISL implementation we are aware of, we charac-
terize its insertion, deletion, and query behavior under concurrent accesses.
We implemented Lumen in C, using Concurrency Kit [31] as a portable
interface to platform-specific synchronization primitives, atomic operations,
memory barriers, and concurrent data structures. As interval insertion may
require memory allocation, we use nedmalloc [32], a fast parallel malloc()
implementation with per-thread caches. Our experiments are run on a server
with 4 Intel Xeon E7-4860 processors running at 2.27 GHz. Each socket has
10 cores with two-way simultaneous multithreading, for a total of 40 cores
and 80 hardware threads. The server runs Redhat Enterprise Linux 6.3,
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Table 4.1: Test machine configurations for a desktop (DT ), laptop (LT ),
workstation (WS), cloud server (CS), and smartphone (SP ), all running
Linux. We characterize the address space complexity of these machines,
averaged over a long period of normal use, and compare virtual memory to
Lumen in terms of storage overhead. We only count those parts of virtual
memory data structures necessary to provide protections identical to
Lumen: non-leaf page table entries (PTEs), 1 byte for permissions on leaf
PTEs, 9 pointers per mm struct, and 3 pointers per vm area struct. The
Linux kernel keeps one mm struct per task and one vm area struct per
distinct virtual memory area (VMA). Lumen can provide identical
protection using an average of 6.2× less memory.
Machine DT LT WS CS SP
Kernel 3.2.0 64b 3.2.0 64b 2.6.32 64b 3.0.0 32b
3.0.31 32b
(Android 4.1)
RAM 16GB 4GB 64GB 512MB 512MB
Processor
Intel
i7-2600K
Intel
T7500
4× Intel
L7555
Intel L5520
(Virtual)
ARM
Cortex A8
Frequency 3.7 GHz 2.2 GHz 1.87 GHz 2.27 GHz 1 GHz
Cores/Threads 4/8 2/2 32/64 4/4 1/1
Characterization
Processes 277 224 262 123 143
User/Kernel
Threads
630/105 608/70 134/213 169/47 626/92
Unique Open
Files
9222 9471 723 678 979
Unique/Total
VMAs
16353/
52459
10798/
40589
1862/
3651
1782/
5157
8757/
16126
Pg. Tbl.
Prot. Stor-
age
35.26MB 19.11MB 5.15MB 1.30MB 3.11MB
Lumen
Storage
4.65MB 3.03MB 525KB 258KB 1.263MB
Lumen Strg.
Savings
7.59× 6.30× 9.82× 4.77× 2.46×
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Figure 4.1: Virtual memory areas (VMAs) across kernel- and user-space.
The fundamental address space complexity varies by a factor of five
between a smartphone and a desktop. Most regions are duplicates.
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which in turn uses the 2.6.32 Linux kernel.
In a multithreaded experiment, threads are first distributed one per core
within a single socket, then one per core on the other three sockets, then
on the other thread on all 40 cores. Thus, experiments with fewer than ten
threads will behave as though run on a single socket machine with single-
threaded cores. Experiments with 11 to 40 threads will experience non-
uniform memory access (NUMA) effects from running across multiple sock-
ets, but will not experience the resource contention effects of multithreading.
Experiments with 41 to 80 threads will experience both NUMA and multi-
threading effects.
In these experiments, we evaluate a userspace, pure software implementa-
tion of Lumen with no hardware caching or ISL traversal support. Per-
formance would be better and more consistent in a hardware-supported,
kernel-mode implementation of Lumen. For each experiment, we present
the median of seven runs.
Inspired by the methodology used by Sundell and Tsigas to characterize a
concurrent skip list [18], we vary the number of threads concurrently accessing
the ISL, the mix of insertion, removal, and query operations these accessors
perform, and the size of the ISL. In each experiment, a set of intervals is
randomly generated such that each address in the address space is covered
by an average of four intervals. Some intervals are inserted into the ISL in
the setup phase to set the initial size of the ISL, and the remainder of the
intervals are distributed equally among the accessor threads. All accessors are
assigned two weights that govern the frequency of query and insert/remove
operations; insertions and removals are assigned the same weight to keep the
size of the ISL roughly constant throughout the experiment. The accessors
then perform ISL operations in a tight loop in a randomized but valid order —
an interval can only be removed after it has been inserted — according to the
given weights. Note that, for performance-oriented applications of Lumen,
interval insertion and removal are rare, and the LumenCache captures most
stabbing queries; thus, even in highly parallel systems, the ISL will often have
a small number of concurrent accessors.
Figure 4.2 shows the ISL’s performance for a workload consisting of 10%
insertions, 10% removals, and 80% queries. Such an operation mix is repre-
sentative of a heavyweight debugging, security, or reliability application of
Lumen, where intervals are inserted very frequently for fine-grained opera-
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tions like function calls. Insertions and removals take roughly 4000–32000
cycles in the single-socket experiments; insertions take slightly longer than
removals, as shown in Figure 4.2d, because they allocate memory on the
heap. In the single-socket experiments, queries take 500–10000 cycles, de-
pending on thread count and ISL size; query time grows logarithmically with
ISL size as expected. The relatively small latency difference between 1, 2, 4,
and 8 threads for all but the smallest ISLs suggests that Lumen’s concur-
rency scheme is effective in maximizing throughput under many concurrent
accessors. This result is promising evidence for Lumen’s potential as a high
performance memory protection scheme for highly parallel systems.
The results for 16–80 threads in Figure 4.2 shows that sharing a single
ISL across sockets significantly decreases performance. For example, query
latency for a 16k interval ISL only grows by 1.77× from 1 to 8 threads
on a single socket, but grows dramatically once the ISL is split across two
or four sockets; query latency grows by 2.46× from 8 to 16 threads, then
again by 9.24× from 16 to 32 threads. These results echo previous findings
that the QuickPath Interconnect (QPI) between sockets is a bottleneck for
programs with fine-grained data sharing; Li et al. [33], using a similar quad-
socket system, found that accessing memory on a remote socket over QPI had
2.3×–4.7× lower bandwidth and 24%–56% higher latency than local DRAM.
These multi-socket effects are complex and merit closer examination in future
work.
Figure 4.3 shows the ISL’s performance for 0.1% insertions, 0.1% removals,
and 99.8% queries. This operation mix is more representative of typical
performance-oriented use cases for Lumen, where intervals are only used for
per-process code, stack, heap, and mmap()ed regions.
4.3 System Performance
The total overhead imposed by Lumen on applications is a function of
the underlying Lumen data structure, the effectiveness of hardware inter-
val caching, address space complexity, and memory access patterns. The
long application runtimes required to characterize Lumen for large, memory-
intensive applications make cycle-accurate simulation prohibitive. We there-
fore characterize Lumen’s overhead by instrumenting applications running
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Figure 4.2: ISL insert, remove, and query performance for 1–80 concurrent
threads performing 10% insertions, 10% removals, and 80% queries.
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Figure 4.3: ISL insert, remove, and query performance for 1–80 concurrent
threads performing 1% insertions, 1% removals, and 98% queries.
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natively on real hardware. We wrote a Pin [34] tool to maintain and query
a shadow ISL for single- or multi-threaded applications, while simulating
several sizes of per-core interval caches.
The pintool maintains a set of coarse-grained protection intervals, equiv-
alent to what is provided by the baseline page-based protections, by pars-
ing /proc/self/maps at startup and intercepting successful mmap, munmap,
mremap, mprotect, and brk system calls. Intervals are inserted and removed
from the ISL as appropriate to maintain an accurate map of the process’
address space. The tool instruments all memory reads and writes in the ap-
plication, including all libraries, to query a simulated interval cache. If the
access misses in the interval cache, the tool queries the ISL in software and
fills an entry into the cache. All insertions, removals, and queries are timed
to provide an accurate overhead estimate. We divide the total insertion, re-
moval, and query time by the uninstrumented runtime of the application to
determine an estimated runtime overhead of Lumen with a LumenCache.
We ran the Parsec 3.0 [35] parallel benchmark on the 80-core server, using
one, two, and four threads and the simlarge inputs. We found that, when
Lumen was configured to provide the same protections as the baseline oper-
ating system, even a 4-entry LumenCache yielded a hit rate of over 99.9%
and a performance overhead of well under 1% for all benchmarks. Note that
a 4-entry LumenCache consumes much less power and area than the per-
core TLBs found in modern architectures. We then extended the pintool to
a debugging scenario where Lumen also inserted and removed intervals for
every malloc() and free() call; for the Parsec benchmarks, an 8-entry Lu-
menCache sufficed to yield hit rates of over 99% and performance overheads
between 0.1% and 2.5×. We leave a more detailed study of the system-level
overhead of Lumen in performance-, security-, and debugging-oriented sce-
narios to future work.
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CHAPTER 5
LUMEN APPLICATIONS AND
EXTENSIONS
Numerous applications for region-tracking systems in serial and parallel de-
bugging and taint tracking have been proposed in the literature [22, 23]. We
list some additional applications and possible extensions here:
Stack Protection Runtime stack protection can be implemented with Lu-
men as follows: In each function prologue, a thread creates an interval cover-
ing the current stack frame; the interval should be read-write for the calling
thread, and inaccessible to other threads, except in special circumstances
where stack-allocated variables are temporarily shared among threads. At
each function call, the thread sets its own stack frame interval to inaccessible
before jumping to the callee, so that the callee cannot read or clobber parent
stack frames. At each function return, the caller removes its stack frame in-
terval from the ISL, jumps to the caller, and the caller re-enables read-write
access on the caller’s stack frame interval.
If this is a common use case, we can augment Lumen interval descriptors
to include an explicit end address, rather than encode the end address explic-
itly by the pattern of interval markers in the ISL. With this extension, the
end address can be manipulated in a single operation, greatly accelerating
permissions operations on contiguous intervals like stacks which grow and
shrink frequently. Function prologues and return points would only need to
modify the stack interval’s endpoint, rather than insert and remove a new
interval for every function call.
Heap Protection Dynamic memory allocation is prone to programmer
error. Numerous tools have been developed to allow memory allocations
and accesses to be monitored, but incur a high runtime and memory over-
head. Lumen can be used to implement similar capabilities, such as detect-
ing double-free, use-after-free, and buffer overflows, by creating fine-grained
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regions for dynamically allocated memory, marking unallocated heap re-
gions as inaccessible by default. Runtime virtual-memory-based tools like
DUMA [36] cause memory fragmentation by using at least 2 pages for each
allocation. Binary instrumentation and translation frameworks like Val-
grind [37] impose a runtime overhead of 2–50×. Compile-time tools like
Address Sanitizer (ASan) [38] have smaller runtime overhead, but have sub-
stantial memory overhead and cannot be used without recompiling from
source. Lumen can provide similar capabilities to ASan with lower over-
head by leveraging the LumenCache. Our results in Section 4 include an
instrumented thread-caching heap allocator that inserts an ISL interval for
every heap-allocated region.
Prefetching and Profiling The LumenCache and Lumen ISL can be
augmented to store arbitrary metadata about memory regions, in addition
to permissions. For example, extra metadata may be used to efficiently
count the number of memory accesses or instruction fetches in a range of ad-
dresses, or to produce targeted hardware prefetches when certain addresses
are touched. Somogyi et al. [39] discuss the prefetching benefits of correlat-
ing spatial and temporal access information, and Lumen can efficiently and
flexibly track spatial properties of an application’s access stream. We leave
further exploration of these opportunities to future work.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
Our focus on scalability when developing Lumen is in line with a trend with
a growing concern for concurrency in shared system data structures. For
example, Clements et al. [40] noticed that the Linux kernel’s per-process
red-black trees of virtual memory regions, guarded by a single read/write
lock, limited the scalability of their parallel benchmark suite on an 80-core
machine. They improved application performance by 1.7–3.4× by replac-
ing the red-black tree with a lock-free balanced tree using read-copy-update
(RCU) synchronization [41].
Single address space operating systems (SASOS) were motivated by many
of the same concerns as Lumen as well as the decreased scarcity of virtual
addresses in 64-bit systems. A SASOS runs all threads in the system in a
single flat address space and implements a memory management scheme to
share or protect data as directed by applications. Vochteloo [42] provides an
overview of SASOS memory protection schemes. Most SASOSs either use
capabilities — bit-vectors carried around as proof of a thread’s permissions to
an object [43] — or rely on the page table machinery in existing systems to
enforce protection, with the same redundancy and granularity pitfalls as vir-
tual memory [44]. A capability-based SASOS can either provide probabilistic
protection by hiding data in a very large virtual address space, or provide
complete protection using an intermediary layer of kernel-mode software to
validate capabilities before granting access. Lumen provides complete pro-
tection by mediating all accesses through the ISL, but does not use explicit
capabilities.
Published SASOSs tend not to allow hierarchical permissions or sharing,
and store memory metadata in simple data structures not designed for fre-
quent concurrent accesses, such as B+ trees [42]. Lumen’s more general rep-
resentation for memory metadata allows arbitrary hierarchy, improving the
performance of the ISL by reducing redundancy and allowing application and
40
library developers to lay out data to maximize locality and code simplicity,
rather than to satisfy the memory protection system’s requirements. Fur-
ther, Lumen’s ISL has been designed explicitly for high performance under
concurrent lookups and modifications, making it more suitable for modern
systems with many hardware threads.
Witchel et al. [8] proposed Mondrian Memory Protection (MMP), a high-
performance word-granularity permissions scheme for a single virtual or phys-
ical address space. While Lumen grants permission on memory regions to
sets of threads, MMP grants permission on memory regions to protection do-
mains as defined by Lampson [45], which in turn map to static instructions
in running code; that is, a thread is in exactly one protection domain at a
time, and its protection domain depends on what code it’s executing. While
Lumen’s and MMP’s protection domain models are very different on the
surface, they are isomorphic to one another, and the primary fundamental
differences between the two schemes are in the data structure and permissions
semantics.
MMP uses an interval-based data structure, the multi-level permissions trie
(MLPT), but it is still a flattened representation, and shared regions require
duplicate entries across each sharer’s MLPT, incurring the same overhead
and semantic disadvantages as virtual memory based protection. Mondrix,
an extension of MMP implemented in the Linux kernel, introduces group
protection domains, which eliminate this MLPT redundancy if multiple pro-
tection domains require identical permissions [46]. MMP is also designed for
uniprocessors and the authors make no mention of concurrent accesses. MMP
and Lumen both use a CAM-based lookaside buffer to cache permissions.
MMP also caches the interval returned from a lookaside buffer access along-
side the pointer-containing register that triggered the access. These sidecar
registers elide lookaside buffer accesses when a pointer register value is used
to access an interval more than once, but must be kept coherent when permis-
sions change. Lumen implementations may adopt sidecars when profitable.
Whereas MMP’s storage format is dense and optimized for permissions data
only, Lumen is designed to be extensible, allowing arbitrary metadata to be
attached to interval descriptors for debugging, profiling, prefetching, or other
purposes.
Loki tracks permissions data for an address space by tagging every word
with a 32-bit identifier that may be used to ascertain the permissions an
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Table 6.1: Comparison of Lumen, Mondrian Memory Protection [8],
Loki [1], Sentry [7], and traditional threading models.
Scheme Same-Name 
Sharing 
Sharing 
Gran. 
Protection 
Gran. 
Storage Overhead Query 
Time 
Add/Delete Region  
Time 
Modify Region 
Perms. Time 
Mondrian  Word Word 1-10% AppMemory * Ndomains O(1) O(RegionSize*Ndomains) O(RegionSize*Ndomains) 
Loki  Word/Page Word/Page 1-100% PhysicalMemory O(1) O(RegionSize) O(RegionSize) 
Sentry  Cache Line Cache Line Varies Varies Varies Varies 
Multi-Process  Page Page ∝ (1/PageSize * Nprocesses,Total) O(1) O(RegionSize*Nprocesses,Sharing) O(RegionSize*Nprocesses,Sharing) 
Multi-Threading  Byte Page ∝ (1/PageSize) O(1) O(RegionSize) O(RegionSize) 
Lumen  Byte Byte O(Nregions*lg(Nregions)) O(lg(Nregions)) (O(1) if cached) O(lg(Nregions)2) O(lg(Nregions)) 
accessing thread has on the word [1]. The 100% storage overhead of a na¨ıve
Loki implementation can be overcome for allocating a single tag for large
regions of memory with the same identifier; it also bears the composabil-
ity and performance disadvantages of a flattened permissions representation.
MemTracker is a debugging-oriented hardware extension that embeds a pro-
grammable state machine in the processor core [47]; separate state infor-
mation is maintained for each memory word, and the programmable engine
computes state transitions on every memory access. Different state machines
can be used to find several classes of common memory bugs, and MemTracker
performs better than MMP when configured for such a task, but is unsuit-
able as a security, reliability, or memory sharing mechanism. Sentry adds a
metadata cache alongside the L1 data cache that can cache permissions or
other metadata at a cache line granularity [7]. Since it operates at a cache
line granularity, Sentry can rely on existing cache coherence machinery to
keep metadata in sync across the system, and the metadata only needs to be
checked once when it is loaded into the cache. However, this granularity still
imposes restrictions on the size and alignment of memory regions that can be
protected, the permissions metadata is still flattened, and the authors do not
discuss Sentry’s performance under concurrent accesses. Table 6.1 compares
Lumen against these proposed solutions and the status quo multi-process
and multi-threaded protection models; Lumen offers the most flexibility to
software and the strictest protection, and its ISL and LumenCache offer
high performance for a variety of workloads and system goals as shown in
Chapter 4.
The Intel iAPX 432 embodied several bold ideas in hardware support for
safe, high-level programming, including a large number of segments (up to
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224) and capability-based addressing [48]. The iAPX 432’s philosophy of
allocating distinct program objects to different, arbitrary-length segments
to provide stricter protection than virtual memory is in line with Lumen’s
goals. However, flat, statically defined segments carry all the disadvantages
discussed in Chapter 2.
Ternary CAMs (TCAMs) have been used to implement variable-page-
size TLBs [49] and MMP’s Permissions Lookaside Buffer (PLB). A group
of TCAM cells can match any power-of-2 sized, naturally aligned block.
Since Lumen allows intervals of any size and alignment to impose minimal
constraints on software, a TCAM-only LumenCache entry could store the
largest naturally aligned subset of the interval, as is done in the PLB. How-
ever, consider the interval [0x01 -- 0x2E] ([000000012 -- 001011102]).
The largest naturally aligned subset of that interval is 0x10 -- 0x1F, which
could be represented by a TCAM entry storing 0001XXXX2; the subset only
covers 16
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≈ 35% of the interval, whereas 2 8-bit RMBs can cover the entire
interval. By incorporating range-matching cells into the LumenCache, we
increase its reach per entry by up to 3× over TCAM-only structures like the
PLB. For a given workload, however, the distribution of interval alignments
may lend itself to a LumenCache consisting of only TCAM entries, some
TCAM and some RMB entries, or hybrid entries with some TCAM bits and
some RMB bits.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Lumen is an effective technique for providing fine-grained arbitrary protec-
tion to regions of memory within a single address space. It removes the
need to trade off protection granularity and performance, and the dichotomy
between multi-thread and multi-process threading models forced by conven-
tional virtual memory based protection. Lumen intervals may be stored,
modified, and retrieved efficiently, and overhead can be reduced further via
the LumenCache. Future systems can use Lumen to store other types of
memory region metadata for performance, profiling, debugging.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVAL SKIP LIST STABBING QUERY
RESULT ORDER
As discussed in Section 3.2, Lumen’s semantics dictate that, when an address
is covered by multiple intervals, properties specified by smaller intervals take
precedence over those specified by larger intervals. By preventing arbitrarily
overlapping intervals, which are permitted in the ISL as described by Hanson
and Johnson, Lumen’s pyramid constraint dictates a unique, unambiguous
precedence ordering for all intervals covering a given address, decreasing in
priority from smallest to largest. This constraint greatly simplifies the re-
duction operation needed to compute the properties of an address, allowing
it to use a single register in the case of simple, fixed width metadata like ac-
cess permissions. The traversal procedure iterates over the covering intervals
from largest to smallest, storing the metadata for each interval in turn into
the same register; later, smaller intervals will override the metadata set by
earlier, larger intervals if they conflict.
A na¨ıve implementation would therefore need to store all covering inter-
vals while the ISL is traversed, sort them by size, then perform the reduc-
tion. This implied storage and computation overhead is troublesome for a
software implementation of Lumen, but even more so for a hardware ISL
walker, since the overhead is unbounded in the general case. A hardware
walker would need to either allocate a fixed amount of storage and trap to
a software implementation for queries with many covering intervals, or store
intervals in main memory; either option significantly decreases the utility
of a hardware walker and the viability of Lumen as a mainstream memory
protection scheme.
Fortunately, by exploiting the additional information about interval place-
ment due to the pyramid constraint, we can modify the interval insertion
procedure slightly to guarantee that intervals will be visited in sorted order
in Lumen. This guarantee allows constant-space traversals, and admits a
simple hardware implementation that can handle all queries. We show that
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Figure A.1: The pyramid constraint and interval sorting constraint ensure
that an ISL stabbing query will return the intervals enclosing an address
from largest to smallest. Suppose that a stabbing query on address 17
returns 5 covering intervals a–e. We show that the pyramid constraint
implies that a ⊃ d, b ⊃ d, c ⊃ d, and d ⊃ e (Case 1). We impose the
interval sorting constraint to require that a ⊃ c and b ⊃ c (Case 2), and
a ⊃ b (Case 3). These containment relationships constitute a total order on
all intervals returned by a stabbing query.
this guarantee is satisfied for the three cases shown in Figure A.1.
First, we show that interval markers from a forward pointer covering a
given interval are larger than intervals picked up on any subsequent forward
pointers covering a different interval. This situation is labeled as Case 1
in Figure A.1. More formally, consider a query for address Q returning
a set of intervals X. We can show that if Q inserts into X an interval
a = [a.L, a.R] on a forward pointer FPm, then later inserts an interval b =
[b.L, b.R] on a subsequent forward pointer FPn covering an interval FPn.I =
[FPn.I.L,FPn.I.R], where FPm and FPn cover different intervals, then a ⊃ b
(i.e., La ≤ Lb ≤ Rb ≤ Ra ∧ a 6= b).
Definition Let X be set the set of intervals covering an address Q returned
by an ISL query. The elements of X are in the order they were encountered
by the query. Let a and b be two of the returned intervals, a = Xi =
[a.L, a.R], b = Xj = [b.L, b.R], i < j. The markers for a and b were attached
to forward pointers FPm and FPn, respectively. a ∈ FPm, b ∈ FPn,FPm.I =
[FPm.I.L,FPm.I.R],FPn.I = [FPn.I.L,FPn.I.R].
Lemma A.0.1. Suppose FPm.I 6= FPn.I. Then |a| > |b|.
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Proof. 1. a ∈ X, b ∈ X =⇒ Q ∈ a,Q ∈ b because ISL queries only
return intervals containing the query point.
2. Q ∈ a,Q ∈ b =⇒ a ∩ b 6= ∅; a and b overlap.
3. i < j ∧ m 6= n =⇒ FPm.level > FPn.level because ISL queries
traverse levels from highest to lowest, and never pick up markers from
more than one forward pointer on a given level.
4. a ∈ FPm =⇒ a ⊇ FPm.I because of the ISL containment constraint.
5. i < j =⇒ FPm.I.L ≤ FPn.I.L because ISL queries traverse nodes in
nondecreasing key order.
6. FPn.I.L ≤ FPm.I.R because if FPn.I.L > FPm.I.R, then FPm would
have been traversed and a would not have been picked up.
7. FPm.I.L ≤ FPn.I.L ≤ FPn.I.R =⇒ FPm.I∩FPn.I 6= ∅,¬(FPn.I ⊃
FPm.I).
8. FPm.I ∩ FPn.I 6= ∅ ∧ ¬(FPn.I ⊃ FPm.I) ∧ FPm.I 6= FPn.I =⇒
FPm.I ⊃ FPn.I, because the structure of ISL nodes and pointers im-
plies that the intervals covered by two forward pointers either do not
overlap, are equal, or one is a proper subset of the other, similar to the
pyramid constraint we impose on intervals under Lumen.
9. b ∈ FPn ∧ FPm ⊃ FPn =⇒ ¬(b ⊇ FPm.I) =⇒ ¬(b ∈ FPm) because
of the ISL maximality constraint.
10. a ⊇ FPm.I ∧ ¬(b ⊇ FPm.I) =⇒ ¬(b ⊇ a).
11. a ∩ b 6= ∅ ∧ ¬(b ⊇ a) =⇒ a ⊃ b due to the pyramid constraint; if two
intervals overlap, one must be a proper superset of the other.
12. a ⊃ b =⇒ ((a.R− a.L) > (b.R− b.L)). 
We have shown that Lumen’s pyramid constraint and the ISL contain-
ment and maximality conditions guarantee that interval markers from for-
ward pointers covering different intervals are returned by queries in sorted
order, from largest to smallest. A pair of returned intervals may also be
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from different forward pointers covering the same interval or from the same
forward pointer, as shown in cases 2 and 3 of Figure A.1, respectively. We ex-
tend the property of Lemma A.0.1 to these other two cases by requiring that
intervals across all forward pointers covering the same interval be inserted
in sorted order. With this requirement, which we call the interval sorting
constraint (ISC), the intervals in the latter two cases will be traversed by the
query and inserted into the output array X in sorted order. The ISC is eas-
ily implemented under our proposed concurrency scheme, since all forward
pointers covering the same interval will have the same left and right endpoint
nodes, and are thus covered by a single read-write lock. The constraint adds
time overhead to insertions by forcing them to traverse marker lists to find
the appropriate insertion point rather than insert at the beginning of the list.
In our implementation where marker lists are linked lists, this overhead is
linear, but may be reduced to logarithmic by implementing array-, tree-, or
skip list-based marker lists. Forward pointers tend to have few interval mark-
ers, and multiple forward pointers covering the same interval are relatively
rare, significantly mitigating the performance impact of the ISC. Through
the pyramid constraint, ISL invariants, and ISC, we can guarantee that all
intervals returned by a query will be sorted from smallest to largest, allowing
a hardware ISL walker to perform the permissions reduction operation in
constant space. Enabling a simple hardware walker implementation allows
the computational overhead and instruction cache impact of ISL traversal
to be oﬄoaded from the processor pipeline, and makes Lumen’s flexibility
benefits available to mainstream systems where Lumen’s performance must
be comparable to virtual memory-based protection to be viable.
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